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INSURANCE LAW
E. Lewis Kincer, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Virginia has recently decided several
significant cases in the insurance realm. The court has been
most active, at least in number of cases, in the field of unin-
sured [UM] and underinsured motorist [UIM] coverages, fol-
lowed closely by decisions affecting automobile liability insur-
ance policies.' Although no clearly discernable trend appears to
have been established by the court's insurance decisions in the
past year, several observations may be made of the cases, as
well as the court's general philosophy of judicial interpretation
of insurance policies. "An insurance policy is a contract; there-
fore, we give the words used in this policy their ordinary and
usual meaning when they are susceptible of such construction.
If the policy language is unambiguous, we do not resort to rules
of construction. We simply apply the terms of the policy as
written."2 The following cases should be evaluated in light of
these standards.
Judicial discovery of supposed "ambiguities" in insurance
contracts, or statutes governing policy content or coverages, is a
potent weapon for invalidating terms and conditions that cer-
tain courts may find unpalatable or unfair in the context of a
given case. A review of Virginia case law over an extended
* Director, Mezzullo & McCandlish, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; BA., 1977, Uni-
versity of Virginia; J.D., 1982, University of Louisville. I would like to thank the staff
of the University of Richmond Law Review for their hard work and assistance with
this article.
1. The court's volume of cases in the automobile insurance field is not surprising
given the ubiquitous nature of the automobile in modem life. Additionally, automobile
liability insurance is, like most aspects of the insurance industry, heavily regulated
by statute and administrative rule-making.
2. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Walton, 244 Va. -498, 501-02, 423 S.E.2d
188, 191 (1992) (citations omitted).
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period shows a marked restraint by the courts in the frequency
of policy language invalidation on the grounds of ambiguity.3 In
several recent cases where statutory or policy ambiguities were
held to invalidate certain provisions of the insurance contract,
strong dissents were occasioned, usually by the more senior
members of the court.4
II. UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
The basic statutory provision governing the requirements and
duties of an insurance carrier writing policies in Virginia is
found in Virginia Code section 38.2-2206.' As noted above, EJM
and UIM disputes were the most frequently addressed topics by
the court in the past year.
A. UM Coverage for Criminal Acts
The issue of UM coverage for criminal acts was addressed by
the court in Erie Insurance Co. v. Jones.6 The issue, usually
involving a shooting and the presence of an automobile, is
whether the claimed injury arose from the "ownership, mainte-
nance or use" of a motor vehicle so as to trigger UM coverage
for the victim.7 Lower court decisions were not consistent, but
tended to favor coverage.8
Jones involved a UM claim resulting from an allegedly acci-
3. The ambiguities are most often found in policy language restricting, excluding
or denying coverage to an insured in a given situation, are always drafted by the
insurer and under virtually universal tenets of construction are construed against the
insurer.
4. See USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 248 Va. 185, 445 S.E.2d 145
(1994); Hackett v. Arlington County, 247 Va. 41, 439 S.E.2d 348 (1994).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
6. 248 Va. 437, 448 S.E.2d 655 (1994).
7. See State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 500-01, 318 S.E.2d
393, 397 (1984).
8. See Hartfield v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 31 Va. Cir. 240 (1993) (holding that
a drive-by shooting by another unknown motorist on Interstate 95 afforded UJM cover-
age to the victim). The trial court relied on a "but for" test in establishing UM cover-
age, i.e., that the vehicle "was the instrumentality and was the accessory for inflict-
ing the injury because the shooting would not have occurred but for the placement of
the vehicles then moving." Id. at 241. The Supreme Court wholly rejected such an
expansive test of coverage in Jones. See Jones, 248 Va. at 441-42, 448 S.E.2d at 658.
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dental shooting of an automobile passenger by the driver or
occupant of another vehicle, after both vehicles were stopped on
a public road? One vehicle followed another, flashing its
lights.10 The vehicles came to a stop, possibly touching, and
the driver or occupant of the first vehicle emerged with a ri-
fle." While tapping the rifle barrel against the second car's
window, the gun discharged, killing a backseat passenger.' A
wrongful death action was filed by the passenger's personal
representative, and the insurers were served with process as
alleged UM/UIM carriers.'"
The car in which the decedent passenger was riding was
insured by Erie, while Nationwide insured a member of the
decedent's household.'4 The administratrix contended that the
decedent's death arose from the "ownership, maintenance or use
of a motor vehicle" under Virginia Code section 38.2-2206, and
that the two carriers were obligated to provide UM/UIM cover-
age as a result of the shooting.' The vehicle from which the
shooter emerged was uninsured. 6 Erie and Nationwide filed a
declaratory judgment action, requesting a judicial determination
that neither provided UM or UIM coverage as a result of the
incident.' The trial court ruled that the decedent's death
arose from the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured
vehicle, and that the policies afforded UM coverage under the
facts of the accident.' 8
The supreme court reversed, holding that the shooting did
not arise from the ownership, maintenance or use of the unin-
sured truck previously occupied by the shooter.'9 Relying on
9. The shooting was asserted to be accidental but a criminal conviction for invol-
untary manslaughter preceded the civil actions. Jones, 248 Va. at 439, 448 S.E.2d at
656.
10. Id. at 438-39, 448 S.E.2d at 656.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 439, 448 S.E.2d at 656.
15. Id. at 439-40, 448 S.E.2d at 657.
16. Id. at 440, 448 S.E.2d at 657. That vehicle's uninsured status arose from
failure of the insured to give timely notice of the claim under the policy applicable to
the vehicle. Id. at 439, 448 S.E.2d at 656-57.
17. Id. at 439, 448 S.E.2d at 657.
18. Id. at 438, 448 S.E.2d at 656.
19. Id. at 442-43, 448 S.E.2d at 658-59.
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State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Powell," the court said
"there must be a causal relationship between the accident and
employment of the insured motor vehicle as a vehicle."2 As a
matter of first impression, the court also rejected the
administratrix's argument that "but for" the use of the motor
vehicles on a highway, the incident would not have occurred.22
The proximate cause of the decedent's death was "a criminal
assault, one related to the use of an uninsured motor vehicle
only by a chronological sequence of events. Such a risk was
never one within the intendment of the parties to these insur-
ance contracts."23
B. Carrier's Consent to Settlement
In Erie Insurance Exchange v. Shapiro,24 the supreme court
held that an insured's failure to comply with a UM/UIM en-
dorsement, requiring his carrier's consent to settlement, relieved
it of any duty to indemnify the insured in any post-settlement
"John Doe" action. The policy in question was written in Mary-
land and that state's law controlled interpretation of the con-
tract.25
Shapiro, an Erie insured, was involved in an automobile
accident in Virginia."8 He filed suit against a known driver
and John Doe, an unidentified motorist, under a joint and sev-
eral liability theory.2" Shapiro settled with the known, insured
motorist without his carrier's consent and attempted to proceed
against Doe." Erie filed a declaratory judgment action seeking
20. 227 Va. 492, 318 S.E.2d 393 (1984).
21. Jones, 248 Va. at 440, 448 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting Powell, 227 Va. at 500-501,
318 S.E.2d at 397).
22. Id. at 441, 448 S.E.2d at 658. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bright,
850 F. Supp. 493 (W.D. Va. 1994) (describing for a similar factual situation involving
a parking lot shooting, motor vehicles and a claim to liability and UM coverages
under two separate policies). The Bright court rejected the insured's "but for" argu-
ment and held there was no causal connection between the ownership, maintenance
or use of the vehicle in which the victim was shot and the shooting. "In fact, the
harm in this case originated from an external source." Id. at 498.
23. Jones, 248 Va. at 443, 448 S.E.2d at 659.
24. 248 Va. 638, 450 S.E.2d 144 (1994).
25. Id. at 640, 450 S.E.2d at 145.
26. Id. at 639, 450 S.E.2d at 144.
27. Id.
28. Shapiro settled with the defendant's carrier and expressly reserved his right
INSURANCE LAW
a ruling that it was not obligated to pay any judgment which
Shapiro obtained against Doe." The trial court ruled that
Erie's "consent to settlement" provision applied only to
Shapiro's settlement with an uninsured motorist and not to the
policyholder's settlement with the other driver. 0 The trial
court held that while Erie would be entitled to a credit on the
settlement, it still risked exposure for its policy limit above the
settlement amount.3 '
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court, rely-
ing on Maryland law.32 The court correctly read the Erie
UMIUM endorsement, which prohibited settlement "with any-
one who may be liable for the damages, without our written
consent" as including the insured co-defendant. 3 Erie was not
obligated to pay any subsequent judgment against Doe.'
Although interpreting Maryland law, the Shapiro court refer-
enced a similar Virginia case on "consent to settlement" clauses,
upheld in Virginia Farm Bureau v. Gibson.3 5 The Maryland
case law relied upon by the court is not inconsistent with Vir-
ginia authority.
C. UM Coverages Not Subject to Liability Set-Off
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hill,"5 the court
voided a UM-liability coverage "set-off" provision found in many
automobile insurance policies issued in Virginia and blurred the
distinction between class one and class two insureds in a UM
setting.
37
to pursue his claim against Doe. Id. at 640, 450 S.E.2d at 145. See VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
29. Shapiro, 248 Va. at 640, 450 S.E.2d at 145.
30. Id.
31. Id. The settlement with the known driver was $15,000 and the Erie UM/UIM
coverage totaled $20,000, leaving the carrier potentially exposed for $5,000.00, accord-
ing to the trial court. Id. at 642, 450 S.E.2d at 146.
32. Id. at 640, 450 S.E.2d at 145.
33. Id. at 642, 450 S.E.2d at 146.
34. Id.
35. 236 Va. 433, 374 S.E.2d 28 (1988).
36. 247 Va. 78, 439 S.E.2d 335 (1994).
37. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Perry, 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418 (1964).
Insureds of the first class include the named insured and, if residing in the same
household, the spouse and relatives of such insured. Insureds of the second class are
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In Hill, the decedent was a passenger in an automobile
struck by an uninsured motorist. Her representative obtained a
joint and several verdict against the uninsured motorist and the
driver of the automobile in which the decedent was riding.38
The latter automobile was insured by Nationwide ($50,000) and
was being used with permission at the time of the accident.39
The insured driver was also covered by a State Farm policy
($100,000).4" After the verdict, both carriers paid their liability
limits.4' The administrator then filed a declaratory judgment
action against Nationwide and State Farm, alleging that the
decedent was also insured under each policy's UM endorsement,
effectively doubling the available coverage.42 The trial court
agreed with the administrator.'
On appeal, a unanimous supreme court affirmed the trial
court's voiding of Nationwide's set-off provision but split sharply
on the State Farm holding. State Farm's position on appeal was
that its UM endorsement precluded coverage." It noted that
an identical endorsement was held to preclude coverage in
Bayer v. Travelers Indemnity Co.," but the majority distin-
guished Bayer factually and on dissimilarities between the
policies, taken as a whole.4" In the instant case, the court
found that State Farm neither limited its UM coverage to auto-
mobiles owned by the named insured nor restricted the defini-
tion of "insured vehicle" to one appearing on the declaration
sheet.47 Another significant distinction between Bayer and the
those individuals occupying the insured motor vehicle. Id. at 835, 134 S.E.2d at 420.
38. Hill, 247 Va. at 81, 439 S.E.2d at 336.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 81, 439 S.E.2d at 336-37.
44. State Farm's UM endorsement defined "an insured" as "any other person
while occupying an insured motor vehicle" and defined an "insured motor vehicle" as
"a motor vehicle registered in Virginia with respect to which the bodily injury and
property damage liability coverage of the policy applies but shall not include a vehicle
while being used without the permission of the owner." Id. at 81, 439 S.E.2d at 337.
45. Id. at 81, 439 S.E.2d at 336-37 (discussing Bayer v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,
221 Va. 5, 267 S.E.2d 91 (1980)).
46. Id. at 82, 439 S.E.2d at 337. The policy in Bayer restricted UM coverage to
"automobiles owned by the Named Insured" and involved a non-owned vehicle. See Id.
at 83, 439 S.E.2d at 337.
47. Id. at 83, 439 S.E.2d 337-38.
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case sub judice was, according to the majority, the fact that in
Bayer, the operator of the vehicle was not liable for damages
arising from its use, while State Farm's driver was liable, as
evidenced by the joint verdict.' State Farm's UM endorsement
did not exclude coverage under the facts of the case and the
trial court was affirmed on its finding of such coverage.49
Nationwide never disputed that the decedent was covered
under the terms of its UM endorsement as an occupant of the
vehicle it insured. Nationwide relied instead on a set-off provi-
sion in its insurance contract which it acknowledged was de-
signed "to limit the coverage under the policy to a total of
$50,000 per person, regardless of whether the insured is recov-
ering under the liability provision, the UM endorsement, or
both."0 The court held that the provision violated Virginia
Code section 38.2-2206 and was void as against public policy.5'
The court found Nationwide's set-off provision similar in effect
to the contractual limitations on UM payments rejected by the
court in Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.52 The trial court was affirmed as to its holding that Na-
tionwide was obligated to pay an additional $50,000 under its
UM endorsement. 3
Justice Compton, joined by Justices Whiting and Hassell,
criticized the majority's failure to differentiate between class-
one and class-two insureds under State Farm's UM endorse-
ment. "In deciding the State Farm case, the majority has misin-
terpreted the applicable statute, misread the pertinent case law,
and misconstrued the relevant provision of State Farm's insur-
ance policy."'
The dissenters also found the majority's attempt to distin-
guish the instant case from Bayer unpersuasive and believed
the result should have been controlled by that case.55 The
48. Id. at 83, 439 S.E.2d at 338.
49. Id. 439 S.E.2d at 337-38.
50. Id. at 84, 439 S.E.2d at 338.
51. Id. at 86, 439 S.E.2d at 339.
52. 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
53. Hill, 247 Va. at 86, 439 S.E.2d at 339.
54. Id. at 86, 439 S.E.2d at 340 (Compton, Whiting & Hassell, dissenting in
part).
55. Id. at 87, 439 S.E.2d at 340-41.
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decedent's occupancy of a non-owned vehicle operated by a class
one State Farm insured did not render the decedent such an
insured under the UM endorsement in issue and such reason-
ing "involves an unwarranted leap of logic that converts State
Farm's uninsured motorist coverage to accident insurance, a
result never intended by the uninsured motorist statute,...
never authorized by the case law, . . . and never contemplated
by State Farm's contract with its named insured."56 The
dissent's reasoning and interpretation of Bayer appears more
consistent with settled law than the majority's opinion.
D. Effective and Ineffective Waivers of UMI UIM Coverages
Equal to Liability Limits
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Weisman," the court interpreted Virginia Code section 38.2-
2202"8 as requiring the written rejection of UMIUIM limits
equal to liability limits to be done by all named insureds in
order to be effective.
Weisman and his spouse were both named insureds under a
State Farm automobile insurance policy with liability limits of
$100,000/$300,000.1' Their daughter was an insured under the
policy, permanently residing with her parents, but attending
college away from home.6" The daughter was injured in a seri-
ous accident involving a known defendant and a John Doe
defendant."
State Farm's initial policy with the Weismans listed both
husband and wife as named insureds, although the husband's
signature was the only one appearing on the application for
56. Id. at 87, 439 S.E.2d 340 (citations omitted).
57. 247 Va. 199, 441 S.E.2d 16 (1994).
58. Virginia Code § 38.2-2202 requires all original premium notices for automobile
liability insurance to include notice to the insured concerning optional purchase of
health care, disability, and lost income protection, as well as advising the insured of
the increase in UMIUIM coverage to equal liability limits if such limits were "higher
than that required by law" absent a written rejection of such an increase. VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-2202 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
59. Weisman, 247 Va. at 201, 441 S.E.2d at 17.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 200, 441 S.E.2d at 17.
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insurance.6 2 This policy provided for a $100,000/$300,000 liabil-
ity limit, with UMIUIM coverage of $25,000/$50,000, which re-
mained unchanged through the time of the daughter's acci-
dent.63 State Farm sent the Weismans at least six notices as
required under Code section 38.2-2202, advising them of their
right to purchase UM/UIM protection in an amount equal to
their liability limits, unless a written rejection form was execut-
ed.' The husband signed such a form in 1985, but his wife
did not, although State Farm sent all renewal notices and bill-
ings to Mr. & Mrs. Weisman.65 Four years after Weisman's
rejection of UMJUIM coverage equal to his liability limits, his
daughter was involved in the accident and filed a declaratory
judgment action against State Farm seeking UMJUIM protec-
tion of $100,000.66 The trial court found coverage in that
amount was available to her.7
The supreme court affirmed, and interpreted Virginia Code
section 38.2-2202 as requiring each named insured to reject the
higher limits." Since Mrs. Weisman was a named insured who
never signed the rejection form, the UM/UIM limits were equal
to the liability coverage at the time of the accident.69
The court noted that such a "bright-line" rule would benefit
both insurers and named insureds by eliminating disputes over
UM/UIM limits in similar situations.7 °
The court noted that Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(A) re-
quires "the insured" to reject the enhanced coverage.' Read
literally, any permissive user of a motor vehicle would have to
join in the rejection and the court presumed the General As-
62. Id. at 201, 441 S.E.2d at 18.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 200, 441 S.E.2d at 17.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 203, 441 S.E.2d at 19.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 204, 441 S.E.2d at 19. The court rejected State Farm's arguments that
Weisman was acting in an express or implied agency capacity for his wife when he
signed the 1985 rejection form as lacking evidentiary support in the record. Id. at
203, 441 S.E.2d at 19.
71. Id. at 202, 441 S.E.2d at 18.
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sembly did not intend such an absurd, impossible result."
Therefore, the court judicially engrafted the phrase "each
named" into the statutory scheme."3
Despite the husband's clear rejection of higher UM/UIM lim-
its, the insureds were rewarded in this instance with enhanced
insurance coverage after the fact, which is the most economical
type.74 Given the fact that the injured party seeking increased
UM protection was not the named insured whose rejection or
acceptance of higher limits was relevant to the court's analysis,
a strong argument could be made for an opposite result.
In USAA Casualty Insurance Co. v. Alexander,75 the su-
preme court resolved issues concerning the validity of an
insured's earlier rejection of L1IIJIM coverage equal to his lia-
bility limit in view of the insured's non-response to a subse-
quently mailed waiver accompanying a renewal policy, as well
as the availability of UIM "stacking" to an insured electing
minimum limits of coverage.7"
Pursuant to Virginia Code section 38.2-2206, Alexander, the
named insured under a USAA policy, signed and returned a
waiver form in which he rejected UM/tUIM coverage equal to
his $100,000 liability limits.77 This election was made seven
years prior to a serious accident implicating such coverage."
Approximately one year prior to the accident, the insured was
sent another waiver form which accompanied a renewal policy,
but he failed to respond in any manner to the waiver form."
The trial court ruled in a declaratory judgment action that by
furnishing its insured with a new waiver, USAA "triggered a
new policy limit selection decision" and that Alexander's failure
72. Id. at 202-03, 441 S.E.2d at 18-19.
73. See Hackett v. Arlington Co., 247 Va. 41, 439 S.E.2d 348 (1994) (documenting
Justice Compton's criticism of the court for similar judicial legislation when it added
'underinsured" motorist protection to a statute requiring self-insured entities to pro-
vide only uninsured motorist coverage).
74. Weisman, 247 Va. at 204, 441 S.E.2d at 19.
75. 248 Va. 185, 445 S.E.2d 145 (1994).
76. See also Goodville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Borror, 221 Va. 967, 275 S.E.2d 625
(1981).
77. Alexander, 248 Va. at 189, 445 S.E.2d at 147.
78. Id. at 189, 445 S.E.2d at 146.
79. Id. at 189, 445 S.E.2d at 147.
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to return the form resulted in UM/UIM limits equal to his
liability limits."
The supreme court rejected the insured's argument that the
trial court's holding was supported by White v. National Union
Fire Insurance Co.8 Distinguishing the insured's incomplete,
inadequate but returned waiver form in White from the
insured's silence by inaction in the instant case, the court held
that the insured's non-responsiveness to the later waiver "was
not sufficient to negate [his] earlier decision to reject the higher
limits of UM coverage."82 The insured's U1M coverage remained
at the level of his previous election, $25,000.
Another issue the court addressed was treatment of the
$25,000 UM policy with other UMUIM coverages available to
Alexander.' Since the defendant had an automobile liability
insurance policy providing $50,000 per person in coverage, the
insurer argued that Sherman Alexander's policy affording only
$25,000 limits for UM coverage could not be stacked or aggre-
gated in the UIM calculation.' The insurer relied on Virginia
Code section 38.2-2206(A) which provided in pertinent part:
[N]o policy or contract of bodily injury... liability insur-
ance relating to the ownership, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle shall be issued or delivered in this Common-
wealth. . . unless it contains an endorsement or provisions
undertaking to pay the insured all sums that he is legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits not less than
the requirements of § 46.2-100. Those limits shall equal but
not exceed the limits of the liability insurance provided by
the policy, unless the insured rejects the additional unin-
80. Id.
81. 913 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1990) (describing how an employee of the insured
corporation signed and returned the form but made no election whatsoever among the
coverage options listed).
82. Alexander, 248 Va. at 190, 445 S.E.2d at 147.
83. Id. at 190, 445 S.E.2d at 147-148.
84. Alexander was a resident of the same household with two sons, each of whom
had separate automobile liability policies. Scott Alexander, who was in the vehicle
with his father at the time of the accident, had a USAA casualty policy providing
$100,000 UM coverage per person and the second son had $50,000 in UM coverage
on a separate issued by the same carrier. Id. at 187, 445 S.E.2d at 148.
85. Id. at 193, 445 S.E.2d at 148.
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sured motorist insurance coverage by notifying the insurer
as provided in subsection B of § 38.2-2202."6
Alexander had purchased $25,000 in TM coverage, not the
"higher limits" referenced in the statute and thus could not
utilize that policy in the UIM calculation, according to the in-
surer.
8 7
The court rejected the insurers' contention and noted a statu-
tory ambiguity in section 38.2-2206. Although ostensibly requir-
ing the purchase of higher limits in Section (A), "Code § 38.2-
2206(B) provides that 'the extent to which the vehicle is
underinsured' is determined not by whether the insured has
contracted for higher limits, but by a comparison of 'the total
amount of uninsured motorist coverage afforded any person'
with the total amount of liability insurance available for pay-
ment.""8 The court resolved the perceived ambiguity by holding
that the legislative purpose of the statute was promoted by
allowing minimum limits UM coverage in the UIM calculation
when the total amount of uninsured motorist coverage afforded
is greater than the statutory minimum. 9
Justice Compton, joined by Justice Whiting, dissented on this
point. According to the dissent, the statute requires an insured
to obtain higher limits as a condition precedent to UIM cover-
age in "clear, unambiguous language." ° Since the majority cor-
rectly ascertained that Alexander did not contract for higher
limits, no further discussion on the point was required, accord-
ing to the dissenters.9 '
Alexander contains a good overall analysis of UM/UIM
coverages and was, on the whole, correctly decided. However, a
close reading of Code section 38.2-2206 indicates the majority's
perceived ambiguity between the requirements of subsections
86. Where the insured contracts for higher limits, the endorsement or provisions
for those limits shall also obligate the insurer to make payment for bodily injury...
caused by the operation or use of an underinsured motor vehicle to the extent the
vehicle is underinsured, as defined in subsection B of this section. Id. at 193, 445
S.E.2d at 149.
87. Id. at 193-94, 445 S.E.2d at 149.
88. Id. at 194, 445 S.E.2d at 150.
89. Id. at 195, 445 S.E.2d at 150.
90. Id. (Compton, J. joined by Whiting, J., dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 196, 445 S.E.2d at 151.
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(A) and (B) to be nothing more than a condition precedent not-
ed in the dissent. By the express terms of the statute, an in-
sured seeking the benefit of subsection B's UIM calculation
must first "contract for [and pay for] higher limits."92 Alexan-
der has judicially abrogated such a requirement.
E. Parents Claim for Loss of Minor's Services Not Covered by
UIM Property Damage Endorsement
In Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Frazier,93
the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the contention of an
insured, accepted by the trial court, that an automobile liability
insurance policy's UM property damage endorsement included
loss of services to a minor child.
After exhausting the UM bodily injury limits available to
their teenage daughter under two Farm Bureau related policies,
the parents sought to recover under the policies' UM property
damage (UMPD) provision for loss of the infant's services, as-
serting that their claim was in the nature of damage to their
property, not bodily injury to their daughter.94 The trial court
granted the insured's summary judgment motion, relying on
Watson v. Daniel95 and agreeing that the claim was for "pecu-
niary losses to their estate incurred for medical care and other
expenses in behalf of their infant daughter."96
The court reversed and entered final judgment for the insur-
er.9" Neither party contended that the language in the UMPD
92. Id.
93. 247 Va. 172, 440 S.E.2d 898 (1994).
94. Farm Bureau's UM coverage obligated it to pay "all sums which the in-
sured... shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured or property
damage, caused by accident and arising out of ownership, maintenance or use of such
uninsured motor vehicle" while excluding the first $200 of any property damage
claimed per accident. Id. at 175, 440 S.E.2d at 899. The policy further defined prop-
erty damage as injury or destruction of a motor vehicle and its contents or "any
other property (except a motor vehicle) owned by an insured and located in Virginia"
Id.
95. 165 Va. 564, 183 S.E. 183 (1936) (holding that the five year property damage
statute of limitations applied to a parent's claim for loss of services rather than the
then one year personal injury statute).
96. Frazier, 247 Va. at 175, 440 S.E.2d at 899.
97. Id. at 179, 440 S.E.2d at 901-02.
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endorsement was ambiguous, and the court stated it would "in-
terpret the contracts by examining the explicit language of the
agreements."98 The court found that the policy exclusion for
the initial $200 in property damage and the requirement that
"any other property" be situated in Virginia did not indicate
any intention to include intangible personal property under the
UMPD endorsement. 9 The court held that only tangible per-
sonal property was within the purview of the policy and dis-
counted Watson as merely a limitations of action case.'0 0
In a brief but logically compelling dissent, Chief Justice
Carrico maintained that Watson controlled the case and accept-
ed the insureds' argument that their claim "fit nicely within the
'any other property' clause of the 'property damage' provisions
of the UM coverage" provided by their policy.'0'
If the insurer intended to exclude intangible personal proper-
ty from its UMPD endorsement, it could have easily done so.
The court rescued the insurer from its lack of foresight in the
face of a novel, innovative, but ultimately unsuccessful legal
argument.
F. UM Requirements for Self-Insured Municipalities and
Virginia Municipal Liability Pool Members
The court held in Hackett v. Arlington County..2 that a self-
insured municipality was required under section 38.2-2206 of
the Code of Virginia to provide underinsurance coverage to its
employee, a police officer injured by a fleeing motorist during a
high speed pursuit.
The officer filed suit against the motorist involved in the
collision and recovered a judgment of $130,000 in combined
compensatory and punitive damages."3 The defendant had au-
tomobile liability insurance coverage of $100,000.'14 The officer
98. Id. at 176, 440 S.E.2d at 900.
99. Id. at 178, 440 S.E.2d at 901.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 179, 440 S.E.2d at 902 (Carrico, C.J., dissenting).
102. 247 Va. 41, 439 S.E.2d 348 (1994).
103. Id. at 42, 439 S.E.2d at 348.
104. Id.
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then filed an action against the county for the underinsured,
unsatisfied portion of the judgment, asserting that Arlington's
status as self-insurer obligated it to pay the UIM deficiency.0 5
The trial court agreed with the county's position and the officer
appealed.'
The supreme court reversed, holding that coverage against
underinsured motorists is part of section 38.2-2206, that the
definition of an underinsured motor vehicle is contained in that
section and that the county was required as a self-insurer to
pay the $30,000 underinsured portion of the judgment.0 7 Jus-
tice Compton concurred in the result in deference to precedent
established in William v. City of Newport News,"5 but read
the statute narrowly and observed that the statute did not
mention UIM coverage. He asserted that Hackett was "another
episode in judicial legislation.""
In reading the enabling legislation for self-insured entities, it
is true that only protection against uninsured motorists is re-
quired. Although the majority was correct that underinsured
motorist coverage is defined in section 38.2-2206, it is equally
true that an underinsured motorist is not an uninsured mo-
torist, by the very terms of the same statute. The majority's
observation that in a commercial setting, UM and UIM
coverages are inseparable is not relevant to the requirements of
coverage for self-insurers under section 46.2-368, and Justice
Compton's observation that "if language is to be added... it
should be added by the General Assembly, not this Court""0
appears more consistent with usual Virginia precepts of judicial
construction than the majority's holding.
In Virginia Municipal Liability Pool v. Kennon,"' the Sher-
iff of Louisa County was involved in an automobile accident
while riding in a county-owned and Virginia Municipal Liability
105. Id. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-368(B)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cum. Supp. 1995)
(requiring a self-insurer to furnish "protection against the uninsured or underinsured
motorist to the extent required by [Code] § 38.2-2206").
106. Hackett, 247 Va. at 42, 439 S.E.2d at 348.
107. Id.
108. 240 Va. 425, 397 S.E.2d 813 (1990) (Compton, J., dissenting).
109. Hackett, 247 Va. at 44, 439 S.E.2d at 349.
110. Id.
111. 247 Va. 254, 441 S.E.2d 8 (1994).
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Pool (VMLP) insured vehicle." The sheriff recovered a judg-
ment substantially in excess of the other driver's liability cover-
age and filed suit against VMLP for the balance under its as-
serted UM liability to him."' The trial court held that by is-
suing UM coverage to municipalities, it had subjected itself to
the requirements of Code section 38.2-2206 and particularly
that section's requirement that UM limits shall equal liability
limits, absent a waiver of such by the insured."
The supreme court reversed the trial court's ruling that the
Virginia Municipal Liability Pool was subject to the require-
ments of Code section 38.2-2206 to provide UM coverage under
the facts presented." VMLP maintained on appeal that it
was not subject to section 38.2-2206." Under the comprehen-
sive statutory scheme regulating VMLP, it would become sub-
ject to UM/UIM requirements only "by resolution of its govern-
ing authority to provide such coverage to its pool members"
which had not been effected." 7 While the trial court focused
on the undisputed fact the VMLP had furnished UM coverage
to its members, the supreme court read the statutory provision
narrowly. The General Assembly required a resolution by the
pool as a prerequisite to the provision of UM coverage"' and
"resolution is a term of art and denotes a specific type of affir-
mative act by a governing body."" Neither VMLP's admission
that it made a collective decision to offer UM coverage nor a
letter from its administrator to pool members acknowledging
112. The Virginia Municipal Liability Pool "is neither a commercial insurer nor a
[slelf-insurer, but a governmental self-insurance pool ... [sluch pools allow local
governments to spread the risk of liability insurance. Code § 15.1-503.4:1." Id. at 256-
57, 441 S.E.2d at 10.
113. Id. at 256, 441 S.E.2d at 9.
114. Id. at 257, 441 S.E.2d at 10. As a pool participant, Louisa County purchased
$1 million in liability coverage and $25,000 in UM coverage. The published opinion is
silent on the waiver issue in view of the case's ultimate disposition. Id. at 256, 441
S.E.2d at 9.
115. Id. at 258, 441 S.E.2d at 10.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 257, 441 S.E.2d at 10.
118. See Code § 15.1-503.4:4 which provides in pertinent part: "Additionally, a
group self-insurance pool shall not be subject to the provisions of § 38.2-2206 relating
to uninsured motorist coverage unless it elects by resolution of its governing authority
to provide such coverage to its pool members." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-503.4:4 (Repl.
Vol. 1989).
119. Kennon, 247 Va. at 257, 441 S.E.2d at 10.
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that the offer of UJM coverage would mandate compliance with
the UM/UIM statute, "is an adequate substitute for the exis-
tence of such a resolution."20
Kennon supports the proposition that an unduly narrow read-
ing of statutes may result in judicial application of form over
substance. The supreme court was correct that the pertinent
statute requires a resolution by VMLP to provide UM coverage.
The trial court was correct that despite the absence of a formal
resolution, VMLP had chosen to make one. Unless the actions
of VMLP in furnishing the UM coverage was an ultra vires act
by a rogue employee (and the record refutes such a contention),
the pool should be subject to the same UM provisions that
govern commercial insurers and self-insured entities.
III. AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY COVERAGES
A. Insurers Not Liable for Prejudgment Interest Which Exceeds
Policy Limits
The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Dairyland Insurance
Co. v. Douthat"2 that liability and underinsured motorist car-
riers were not obligated to pay a prejudgment interest award
which exceeded their policy limits.
Douthat was insured by State Farm for UM/UIM coverage of
$100,000.' She was involved in a 1987 accident with a
Dairyland insured who had $25,000 in liability coverage.' In
1991, Douthat recovered a jury verdict of $95,000 plus prejudg-
ment interest from the date of the accident.' Dairyland paid
the injured party its policy limits of $25,000 and State Farm
paid its total UIM exposure of $75,000.' Douthat thus re-
ceived the entire judgment and $5,000 in prejudgment interest.
She filed suit against State Farm and Dairyland on the re-
spective policies to recover an additional $27,000 in unpaid
120. Id. at 258, 441 S.E.2d at 10.
121. 248 Va. 627, 449 S.E.2d 799 (1994).
122. Id. at 629, 449 S.E.2d at 800.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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prejudgment interest."6 Both carriers contended that their
policy limits had been exhausted and that nothing more was
owed by them."7 The trial court granted Douthat summary
judgment for the unpaid interest."8
The supreme court reversed and entered final judgment for
the insurers, holding that the pertinent policy provisions, in
addition to the distinction between prejudgment and post judg-
ment interest, relieved them of any duty for the excess, unpaid
prejudgment interest."'
Both policies were silent on any specific provision to pay
prejudgment interest.3 ' Douthat asserted that Virginia Code
section 8.01-382"' obligated the insurers to pay prejudgment
interest in excess of their stated limits of liability. 3' Despite
Douthat's argument to the contrary, the court held that the
statute did make a crucial distinction between pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest, with the latter being mandatory
and the former discretionary."' Relying on Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Finley,"4 the court stated that "postjudgment
interest is not an element of damages, but is a statutory award
for delay in the payment of money actually due."" Prejudg-
ment interest according to the court "is part of the actual dam-
ages sought to be recovered."" 6
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 630, 449 S.E.2d at 800.
129. Id. at 632, 449 S.E.2d at 802.
130. State Farm's UM endorsement obligated it to pay "all sums" Douthat was "le-
gally entitled to recover as damages" from the underinsured motorist. Dairyland's
policy stated that its liability limits as set forth on the declaration sheet were its
limits of liability "for all damages ... arising out of bodily injury sustained by one
person as the result of any one occurrence." Id. at 629, 449 S.E.2d at 800. Dairyland
also agreed to pay "all interest on the entire amount of any prejudgment which ac-
crues after entry of the judgment" prior to payment of the judgment not exceeding its
limits of liability. Id.
131. Section 8.01-382 provides in pertinent part that "[tihe judgment or decree
entered shall provide for such interest until such principal sum be paid." VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-382 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
132. Douthat, 248 Va. at 630, 449 S.E.2d at 801.
133. Id. at 631, 449 S.E.2d at 801.
134. 215 Va. 700, 214 S.E.2d 129 (1974).
135. Douthat, 248 Va. at 632, 449 S.E.2d at 801. Finley treats the duty to pay
postjudgment interest as an extra-contractual one, imposed by § 8.01-382 and not as
one dependent on the insurance policy. Finley, 215 Va. at 702, 214 S.E.2d at 131.
136. Douthat, 248 Va. at 631-62, 449 S.E.2d at 801 (citing Monessen S.W. Ry. v.
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Absent an express contractual obligation to pay prejudgment
interest in excess of policy limits, the insurers were not liable
for such amounts. "IT]he trial court effectively rewrote the
parties' insurance contracts in the absence of any overriding
statutory requirement, and it imposed on the insurers an obli-
gation they had not contracted to assume.""7
B. Insurer Not Permitted to Challenge Reasonableness of
Consent Judgment Obtained From Insured After Denial of
Coverage Absent Fraud or Collusion
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Eades,' the court re-
jected the insurer's contention that a $40,000 consent judgment
entered into by an injured pedestrian and an allegedly negli-
gent motorist, on underlying special damages of $1,872, was
subject to challenge for reasonableness in a subsequent lawsuit
to enforce the judgment against the insurer.
The insurer denied coverage to the driver and vehicle owner
and alleged a material misrepresentation on the assigned risk
application concerning business versus personal use of the vehi-
cle involved in the accident." 9 However, other than issue a
denial of the claim, Liberty Mutual did nothing to adjudicate its
material misrepresentation/no coverage position.' ° Subsequent
to the carrier's denial, the driver entered into a consent judg-
ment with Eades, the injured pedestrian, and the order was
entered by a circuit court.14 ' Liberty Mutual did not partici-
pate in or have any knowledge of the agreed judgment or set-
tlement.' The driver assigned all rights against the insurer
to Eades, who filed suit to enforce the $40,000 judgment.'
The court affirmed the trial court's rulings that the consent
judgment was not subject to collateral attack on the grounds of
reasonableness of amount and would be subject to challenge
Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335 (1988)).
137. Id. at 632, 449 S.E.2d at 802 (citation omitted).
138. 248 Va. 285, 448 S.E.2d 631 (1994).
139. Id. at 286, 448 S.E.2d at 632.
140. Id. at 287, 448 S.E.2d at 632.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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only on the basis of fraud or collusion between the parties to
the agreement.' While every other jurisdiction considering
the issue has concluded that such judgments are subject to
challenge on the basis of reasonableness, the court was unper-
suaded by those authorities.'" The court also rejected the
insurer's reliance on Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jewel
Tea Co.,' a contribution action in which the non-settling
tortfeasor was permitted to challenge the underlying settlement
for reasonableness, though it did so in a conclusory fashion.'47
C. Excess Liability Carrier Not Entitled to Contribution From
Second Excess Insurer on Non-Consensual Settlement
Allstate Insurance Co. v. United States Automobile Associa-
tion' involved a claim for contribution by USAA against
Allstate. The underlying tort action and settlement giving rise
to USAA's claim arose from the wrongful death of an infant
who was struck and killed by a dual insured of the carriers.'
USAA insured the permissively loaned vehicle which the defen-
dant driver was operating at the time of the accident and in-
cluded a $300,000 per person primary liability limit and a $1
million excess liability or "umbrella" policy.' Allstate insured
the defendant driver as a named insured under a $1 million
personal umbrella policy.'5'
USAA defended the wrongful death action as primary insur-
er; Allstate hired counsel to monitor the case but did not ac-
tively participate in the defense at any of the three trials even-
tually held.'52 USAA settled the wrongful death action during
the final trial for $590,000 and demanded Allstate contribute
144. Id. at 289, 448 S.E.2d at 633.
145. Id. See Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982).
146. 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961).
147. Eades, 248 Va. at 289, 448 S.E.2d at 633.
148. 249 Va. 9, 452 S.E.2d 859 (1995).
149. Id. at 10-11, 452 S.E.2d at 860.
150. Id. at 11, 452 S.E.2d at 860.
151. Id.
152. The first trial resulted in a $5 million verdict and was set aside by the trial
court, to be retried solely on damages. The second trial ended in a mistrial and
USAA reached settlement with the administrator during the third trial which gave
rise to the declaratory judgment action. Id. at 11, 452 S.E.2d at 860.
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equally to the settlement in excess of the $300,000 primary
liability limits." Allstate refused, and a declaratory judgment
action resulted in a judgment for one half of the settlement
plus interest.M
On appeal, Allstate asserted that it shared no common obli-
gation with USAA for contribution and claimed the trial settle-
ment violated the conditions of its umbrella policy. 5 The
court rejected as "irrelevant" USAA's argument that both carri-
ers shared an obligation to their mutual insured to determine
settlement within the confines of good faith and that absent a
showing of unreasonableness or lack of good faith in settlement,
it should prevail."
The court focused solely on the issue of whether the two
carriers shared a common obligation in the settlement which
would justify equal contribution.' In rejecting such a joint
obligation, the court found that the settlement violated
Allstate's policy terms which required a final judgment against
its insured or a settlement agreement it approved." The
Allstate policy did not violate public policy, despite USAA's
contention that Allstate's refusal to settle was in violation of
the public policy embodied in Virginia Code section 38.2-510,
which prohibits unfair claim settlement practices.5 9
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court gave full effect
to Allstate's policy conditions and interpreted those provisions
as written. Unless the contested provisions were ambiguous,
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. The Allstate policy provided that "we will not begin to make payment for any
occurrence covered by this policy until its liability has been determined by: (1) agree-
ment between the insured, the claimant and Allstate; or (2) a final judgment against
an insured, resulting from an actual trial." Id. at 12, 452 S.E.2d at 861.
156. Id. at 12-13, 452 S.E.2d at 861. Allstate relied on dicta in Erie Ins. Group v.
Hughes, 240 Va. 165, 393 S.E.2d 210 (1990), to the effect that the insured's liability
carrier owed such a "good faith" duty to its insured. The court stated that this obli-
gation differed from the issue of Allstate's duty to USAA. Allstate, 249 Va. at 12-13,
452 S.E.2d at 861.
157. Allstate, 249 Va. at 12-13, 452 S.E.2d at 861.
158. Id. at 14, 452 S.E.2d at 862.
159. USAA apparently relied on subsection 6 of the cited section proscribing failure
"to make prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of claims in which liability has be-
come reasonably clear" with such frequency as to constitute a general business prac-
tice. Id.
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violated public policy, statute or valid regulation, the provisions
should be given effect.
D. Good Faith Purchaser of Stolen Automobile Not Owner
Under Terms of Garage Keepers Property Damage Endorsement
In Hall, Inc. v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 60 the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's determina-
tion that a garage keeper's insurance policy did not provide
coverage for a vehicle fire loss occurring one day after the inno-
cent purchase and attempted but invalid transfer of a stolen
vehicle to the dealership. The lawful owner's insurance carrier
had paid the theft loss, thus becoming the legal owner of the
automobile. 6' The auto was brought to the dealership by the
alleged owner, who presented an invalid certificate of title.'62
A Department of Motor Vehicles record check conducted on the
day of sale erroneously showed the seller as the owner; DMV
had not received notice of the vehicle's theft at the time of the
transfer."
The garage keeper's insurance policy provided fire and casu-
alty coverage to "private passenger autos [that Hall] own[s].
This includes those private passenger autos [that Hall] ac-
quire[s] ownership of after the policy begins."'
The insurer denied coverage to Hall on the grounds that the
policy definition of covered automobiles excluded the stolen
vehicle as Hall did not and could not possess legal title at the
time of the fire.6 ' The court rejected the insured's contention
that its possession of the vehicle through a good faith purchase
vested it with a sufficient ownership interest to bring the auto
within the policy terms. 6' The court relied upon Code section
46.2-100's definition of vehicle ownership as one "who has legal
title to it."'67 The policy requirement that Hall "own" the vehi-
160. 248 Va. 307, 448 S.E.2d 633 (1994).
161. Id. at 308, 448 S.E.2d at 634.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 309, 448 S.E.2d at 634.
164. Id. at 308, 448 S.E.2d at 634.
165. Id. at 309, 448 S.E.2d at 634.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 309, 448 S.E.2d at 635.
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cle was found to be unambiguous. 6 ' Hall's reliance on case
law for the proposition that a good faith purchaser for value
had an insurable interest in the stolen property was rejected as
inapposite to the question of whether the specific terms of the
insurance policy provided coverage for the loss.'69
IV. AUTOMOBILE MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGES
The supreme court reversed a trial court's ruling that a med-
ical payments provision requiring an insured to submit to an
independent medical examination (IME) violated Virginia Code
section 38.2-2206 governing UM/UIM claims.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Eaton,70 the insured submitted
and was paid for approximately $3,000 in medical bills incurred
as a result of an accident with an uninsured motorist. After the
insured's continued treatment for recurring back pain, Allstate
requested an IME pursuant to its medical payments endorse-
ment which provided that "'the injured person shall submit to
physical examination by physicians selected by the Company
when and as often as the Company may reasonably re-
quire.""' The insured refused, on the putative, and perhaps
retrospective, basis that she intended to file a UM claim under
her policy. 72 Eaton sued the insurer for unpaid medical
bills. The lower court held that since Eaton relied on an in-
tention to file a UM claim, her refusal to undergo an IME was
not a breach of the policy provisions requiring such an exami-
nation. 4 In reaching this conclusion, the lower court relied
upon section 38.2-2206(H) which provides in the context of a
UM claim that the establishment of legal liability of an unin-
sured motorist is a prerequisite to recovery and nothing else
may be required of the insured.75
168. Id.
169. Id. at 310, 448 S.E.2d at 635.
170. 248 Va. 426, 448 S.E.2d 652 (1994).
171. Id. at 428, 448 S.E.2d at 653.
172. Allstate's evidence was that the IME request was made and refused in Au-
gust 1990, and that Eaton expressed no intention of filing a UM claim until April
1991. Id. at 428, 448 S.E.2d at 653-54.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 429, 448 S.E.2d at 652.
175. Id. Section 38.2-2206(H) provides:
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The supreme court reversed and entered final judgment for
the insurer.7" The court found no conflict between the UM
statute relied upon by Eaton and the insurer's IME require-
ment contained in the medical payments endorsement." It
also noted there was no prohibition against IME requests in
Code sections 38.2-2201 to -2202, statutes specifically governing
automobile medical payments coverage. 7 ' The court concluded
that the trial court
effectively rewrote the parties' contract and added a condi-
tion to the medical payments provision to which the parties
had not agreed. Further, the trial court failed to apply the
plain language of the medical payments coverage terms,
which does not exempt the insured from compliance with
the independent medical examination requirement when a
UM claim either is contemplated or is made. 79
In Moore v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,'
an automobile medical payments coverage dispute, the supreme
court held inapplicable State Farm's exclusionary language
barring coverage for injuries sustained "through being struck
by ... a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for use
principally off public roads, while not upon public roads" to a
plaintiff struck by a stock car at a race track.'
The subject automobile was originally a standard factory
model, with some deletions of equipment, used exclusively for
off-road racing."2 State Farm's medical payment endorsement
obligated it to pay reasonable medical expenses to an insured
No endorsement or provisions providing the coverage required by sub-
section A of this section shall require arbitration of any claim arising
under the endorsement or provisions, nor may anything be required of
the insured except the establishment of legal liability, nor shall the in-
sured be restricted or prevented in any manner from employing legal
counsel or instituting legal proceedings.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(H) (Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cur. Supp. 1995).
176. Eaton, 248 Va. at 429, 448 S.E.2d at 652.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 430, 448 S.E.2d at 652.
179. Id. at 431, 448 S.E.2d at 655.
180. 248 Va. 432, 448 S.E.2d 611 (1994).
181. Id. at 433, 448 S.E.2d at 612.
182. The vehicle had no lights, turn signals, muffler, mirrors or operable emergen-
cy brake. However, its engine and body frame were unmodified in accordance with
family-class stock car racing requirements. Id. at 434, 448 S.E.2d at 612.
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injured "through being struck by an automobile... of any
type."" State Farm relied on its exclusion and contended that
its medical payments coverage did not extend to the stock
car." The trial court agreed, relying on State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gandy."
The supreme court reversed, having little difficulty concluding
that the stock car which struck plaintiff was "anything other
than an 'automobile' as that word is commonly understood."'86
The automobile was not modified to such an extent as to bring
it within the policy exclusion for "equipment designed for use
principally off public roads." 7 That exclusionary language
failed to "clearly bring the particular event, thing, or circum-
stances in question within its scope.""
V. INSURANCE REGULATION
In National Home Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth,'89 a risk
retention group successfully challenged the authority of the
State Corporation Commission (SCC) to enjoin the group's issu-
ance of policies in Virginia. The SCC acted upon petition of the
Commissioner of the Virginia Bureau of Insurance, who insti-
tuted the action when the company's financial situation wors-
ened, falling below minimum surplus requirements of its state
of incorporation.9 ' After a full evidentiary hearing, the SCC
granted the injunction.'91
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the SCC, holding
that under the Federal Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986,92
183. Id.
184. Id. at 434, 448 S.E.2d at 611.
185. 238 Va. 257, 383 S.E.2d 717 (1989) (upholding the same medical payments
exclusion involving a forklift accident on private property).
186. Moore, 248 Va. at 435, 448 S.E.2d at 613.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Floyd v. Northern Neck Ins. Co., 245 Va. 153, 158, 427 S.E.2d 193,
196 (1993)).
189. 248 Va. 161, 444 S.E.2d 711 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 735 (1995).
190. Id. at 163-64, 444 S.E.2d at 712.
191. Id. at 164, 444 S.E.2d at 713.
192. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906 (1994) exempts risk retention groups from many state
laws and regulations. Such groups are subject to injunctions "issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a petition by the State insurance commissioner alleging
that the group is in hazardous financial condition or is financially impaired." Id. §
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the administrative body was not a "court of competent juris-
diction" empowered to issue injunctions and its actions were
preempted by federal law.'93 The court found that the term
"court of competent jurisdiction" was not defined by the Act and
was ambiguous.14 Relying on legislative history, the court
concluded that the phrase was equivalent to an "independent
judicial officer" and for purposes of the Act, the SCC was "nei-
ther an independent judicial officer" nor a court of competent
jurisdiction as contemplated by Congress."195
In dissent, Justice Lacy, joined by Justices Carrico and Whit-
ing, asserted that the SCC injunction did not violate the federal
prohibition.' The dissenters noted that National Home had
unsuccessfully challenged the SCC injunction in federal district
court, where the court found that Congress' omission in defin-
ing "court of competent jurisdiction" indicated a definitional
reliance on state law.'97 In the minority's view, the SCC had
the power to act as it did and interpreted section 3902 as mere-
ly prohibiting the "independent authority of state insurance
commissioners to issue ... injunction orders,"98 which was
not the case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the past year, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed a
wide variety of cases involving insurance contracts and the
statutory provisions governing them. Most of the cases involved
automobile liability insurance and particularly UM/UIM
coverages. These cases will always provide a fertile field for liti-
gation. The vast majority of the cases were decided consistently
with prior case law and the court's conservative precepts of
contract interpretation. A few were not. However, the court's
3902(a)(1)(H).
193. National Home, 248 Va. at 170, 444 S.E.2d at 714.
194. Id. at 168, 444 S.E.2d at 714.
195. Id. at 170, 444 S.E.2d at 715-16.
196. Id. at 171, 444 S.E.2d at 715.
197. National Home Ins. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 838 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Va.
1993). The district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction against the SCC's
order and equated "court of competent jurisdiction" with "courts having subject matter
jurisdiction," which the SCC did. Id. at 1114.
198. National Home, 248 Va. at 173, 444 S.E.2d at 718 (Lacy, J., dissenting).
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treatment of insurance issues affords claimants and insurers a
greater degree of certainty and consistency in its decision mak-
ing than that sometimes encountered in other jurisdictions.

